

1
2
3
4
5
6
7 **United States District Court**
8 **Central District of California**
9

10 JOSEPH MARTINEZ,

11 Plaintiff,

12 v.

14 DIAB DIAB; ZIAD DIAB; A&M FINE
15 WINE AND LIQUOR INC.,

16 Defendants.

Case No. 2:15-CV-04653-ODW-AS

**ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENT [22]**

18 **I. INTRODUCTION**

19 On June 19, 2015, Joseph Martinez ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against Diab
20 Diab, Ziad Diab, and A&M Fine Wine & Liquor Inc., alleging violation of Title III of
21 the Americans with Disabilities act ("ADA") and the California Unruh Civil Rights
22 Act ("the Unruh Act"), codified in California Civil Code § 51. (ECF No. 1.) The
23 clerk entered default as to Defendants Diab Diab and Ziad Diab on August 7, 2015
24 and August 18, 2015 respectively. (ECF Nos. 12, 16.) On September 17, 2015,
25 Plaintiff filed the present application for default judgment against Defendants Diab
26 Diab and Ziad Diab.¹ Plaintiff seeks statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs as

27
28 ¹ Plaintiff's Application for Entry of Default Judgment does not name the third defendant, A&M
Fine Wine and Liquor Inc.

1 well as injunctive relief requiring Defendants to bring the store into compliance with
 2 the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) and California’s Building Code
 3 requirements. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court **GRANTS**
 4 Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgement against Defendants Diab Diab and Ziab
 5 Diab (hereinafter “Defendants”).

6 II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

7 Plaintiff is a quadriplegic and cannot walk. (ECF No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”)
 8 ¶ 1.) He uses a wheelchair for mobility. (*Id.* ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges that in February
 9 2015, he visited Cabrillo Liquor Store (“the Store”)² and encountered a barrier that
 10 interfered with his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges and
 11 accommodations offered at the facility. (*Id.* ¶¶7–9.) The alleged barrier at issue is a
 12 lack of accessible parking spaces for use by persons with disabilities. (*Id.* ¶10.)
 13 Furthermore, although Plaintiff did not personally encounter further barriers, he
 14 contends the path of travel in and throughout the Store is not wheelchair accessible
 15 because some aisles are less than 36 inches in width. (*Id.* ¶13.)

16 Plaintiff argues that he would like to return and patronize the store but is
 17 deterred from doing so because the Store’s facilities and accommodations are
 18 unavailable to physically disabled patrons like himself. (*Id.* ¶15.) He contends
 19 Defendants were aware of these barriers. (*Id.* ¶18.) The Defendants purportedly
 20 failed to remove these barriers despite having control and dominion over the
 21 conditions of the Store. (*Id.* ¶16, 18.) For these reasons, Plaintiff argues that
 22 Defendant discriminated against him and the physically disabled public by denying
 23 them a full and equal enjoyment of the Store. (*Id.* ¶14.)

24 III. LEGAL STANDARD

25 A. Default Judgment

26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes a district court to grant default
 27 judgment after the Clerk enters default under 55(a). A district court has discretion

28 ²The Store is located at 1316 South Gaffey Street, San Pedro, California.

1 whether to enter default judgment. *Aldabe v. Aldabe*, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.
 2 1980). Upon default, the defendant's liability generally is conclusively established,
 3 and the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true.
 4 *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917–19 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
 5 (citing *Geddes v. United Fin. Grp.*, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).

6 In exercising its discretion, a court must consider several factors (the “*Eitel*
 7 Factors”), including: (1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff; (2) the merits of
 8 plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of
 9 money at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether
 10 the defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy
 11 underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
 12 *Eitel v. McCool*, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986).

13 IV. DISCUSSION

14 A. Procedural Requirements

15 Before a court can enter default judgment against a defendant, the Plaintiff must
 16 satisfy the procedural requirements for default judgment set forth in Federal Rules of
 17 Civil Procedure 54(c) and 55, as well as Local Rule 55-1. Local Rule 55-1 requires
 18 that the movant submit a declaration establishing: (1) when and against which party
 19 default was entered; (2) identification of the pleading to which default was entered;
 20 (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent person, or active service
 21 member; and (4) that the defaulting party was properly served with notice. *Vogel v.*
 22 *Rite Aid Corp.*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

23 Plaintiff has satisfied these requirements. The Clerk entered default on
 24 defendants Diab Diab and Ziad Diab on August 7, 2015 and August 18, 2015
 25 respectively. (ECF Nos. 12, 16.) He also establishes that Defendants are not minors
 26 or infants, incompetent persons, in military service, or otherwise exempted under the
 27 Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940. (ECF No. 22.) Defendants were
 28 served with notice of Application for Default Judgment on September 17, 2015. (ECF

1 Nos. 11, 15.) Finally, Plaintiff complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c)
 2 by requesting a remedy not different in kind from that prayed for in the Complaint.
 3 (ECF Nos. 1, 22.) Plaintiff has thus complied with the procedural prerequisites for
 4 entry of default judgment. *See PepsiCo Inc., v. California Security Cans*, 238 F.
 5 Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the procedural requirements of
 6 Rule 55 and Local Rule 55-1 are been met where plaintiffs address each required
 7 factor in their application for default judgment).

8 **B. *Eitel* Factors**

9 The Court finds that the *Eitel* factors weigh in favor of default judgment. The
 10 Court will discuss each factor in turn.

11 1. Plaintiff Would Suffer Prejudice

12 The first *Eitel* factor considers whether a plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a
 13 default judgment is not entered. *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Plaintiff contends
 14 that he continues to suffer discrimination due to physical disability because of
 15 Defendants' failure to comply with the ADAAG requirements in violation of the ADA
 16 and the Unruh Act. Defendants failed to appear and defend these allegations. Absent
 17 entry of default judgment, Plaintiff will most likely be without recourse, given
 18 Defendants' unwillingness to cooperate and defend. Because Plaintiff will suffer
 19 prejudice if he is without recourse against Defendants, this factor favors entry of
 20 default judgment.

21 2. Plaintiff Brought Meritorious Claims and Plaintiff's Complaint Was
 22 Sufficiently Plead

23 The second and third factors, the merits of Plaintiff's substantive claim and
 24 sufficiency of the Complaint, also support entry of default judgment.

25 i. Americans with Disabilities Act

26 Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated
 27 against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
 28 services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public

1 accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “To prevail on an ADA claim, the plaintiff
 2 must establish that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) defendant is
 3 a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and
 4 (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of his
 5 disability.” *Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc.*, 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007).
 6 Furthermore, to succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination on account of one’s
 7 disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that (1) the
 8 existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier
 9 prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.
 10 *Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest.*, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000).

11 The Court finds that Plaintiff pleaded a valid ADA claim. Here, Plaintiff
 12 alleges (1) that he is disabled (Compl. ¶1); (2) that Defendants’ business is a place of
 13 public accommodation (*Id.* ¶¶ 2, 8); (3) that Plaintiff was denied access to Defendants’
 14 business because of Plaintiff’s disability (*Id.* ¶14); (4) that Defendants’ business has
 15 architectural barriers (including lack of parking spots designated for the disabled and
 16 accessible routes) (*Id.* ¶10); and (5) that removal of the architectural barriers is readily
 17 achievable (*Id.* ¶20). *See Johnson v. Hall*, No. 2:11-cv-2817-GEB-JFM, 2012
 18 WL1604715, at *3, (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that
 19 architectural barriers “are readily removable” and his plea for injunctive relief to
 20 remove all readily achievable barriers satisfies his burden). Because plaintiff’s
 21 allegations are taken as true on default, the Court finds that plaintiff made out a prima
 22 facie Title III discrimination claim.

23 ii. California Unruh Civil Rights Act

24 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides:

25 “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
 26 equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
 27 ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition,
 28 marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full
 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
 privileges, or services in all business establishments of every

1 kind whatsoever.”

2 Cal. Civ. Code. § 51(b).

3 Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.
4 *Johnson v. Singh*, No. 2:10-cv-2547 KJM JFM, 2011 WL 2709365, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal.
5 July 11, 2011). Because Plaintiff’s complaint properly sets out the necessary elements
6 for his ADA claim, Plaintiff satisfies the necessary elements for his Unruh Civil
7 Rights Act claim. Therefore, because there are no policy considerations which
8 preclude the entry of default judgment on this claim, *Eitel*, 782 F.2d at 1471–72, the
9 Court holds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment on his Unruh Civil Rights
Act claim be granted.

10 3. The Amount at Stake Weighs in Favor of Default Judgment

11 The fourth factor balances the sum of money at stake “in relation to the
12 seriousness of the action.” *Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Bayporte Enters., Inc.*, No.
13 C 11–0961–CW, 2011 WL 6141079, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (internal citations
14 and quotations omitted). The amount at stake must not be disproportionate to the
15 harm alleged. *Id.* Default judgment is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is
16 too large or unreasonable in relation to defendant’s conduct. *Truong Giang Corp. v.*
17 *Twinstar Tea Corp.*, No. C 06-03594 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May
18 29, 2007).

19 Plaintiff seeks a judgment of \$8,180.00, inclusive of statutory damages,
20 attorneys’ fees, and costs. Defendants’ liability also includes the amount spent to
21 comply with the injunction.³ However, the ADA limits compliance liability to the
22 removal of barriers that are readily achievable, and in this way caps a defendant’s
23 liability. *Vogel*, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Given Defendants’ failure to appear and
24 defend, and thus their failure to show that Plaintiff’s requested damages are
25 unreasonable or that they have complied with the ADA and Unruh Act, the Court
26 finds that the amount at stake weighs in favor of default judgment.

27
28 ³ Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for physical barriers, including but not limited to handicap
accessible parking spaces and accessible paths of travel.

1 4. There is No Possibility of Dispute as to Material Facts

2 The next *Eitel* factor considers the possibility that material facts are disputed.
3 *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; *Eitel*, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. As discussed, Plaintiff
4 has adequately alleged disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and the
5 Unruh Act by enumerating the barriers at the Store in his complaint. Defendants
6 failed to appear and are therefore held to have admitted all material facts alleged in
7 Plaintiff’s pleading. *See PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (“Upon entry of default,
8 all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except those relating to
9 damages”). Since Plaintiff’s factual allegations are presumed true and Defendants
10 failed to oppose the motion, no factual disputes exist that would preclude the entry of
11 default judgment. This factor, therefore, favors the entry of default judgment against
12 the Defendants.

13 5. There is Little Possibility Default was Due to Excusable Neglect

14 Defendants’ default does not appear to be a result of excusable neglect. Rather,
15 Defendants were properly served with the Complaint on July 20, 2015. (ECF No. 9.)
16 In addition, even after Plaintiff served Defendants with the Request for Entry of
17 Default, Defendants failed to appear in this action or otherwise offer any defense.
18 (*See* ECF Nos. 11, 15.) Other courts recognize that a defendant’s failure to respond
19 after receiving notice is unlikely to constitute excusable neglect. *See, e.g., Craigslist,*
20 *Inc. v. Kerbel*, No. 11-3309, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108573, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2,
21 2012) (noting the unlikelihood that the defendant’s default was due to excusable
22 neglect, “especially when Plaintiffs served not only the summons and complaint, but
23 also the request for entry of default on the Defendant but still received no response.”).
24 Accordingly, the sixth *Eitel* factor favors default judgment.

25 6. Policy for Deciding on the Merits Weights in Favor of Granting Default
26 Judgment

27 In *Eitel*, the court maintained that “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits
28 whenever reasonably possible.” 782 F.2d at 1472. However, where, as in the case at

1 bar, a defendant fails to answer the plaintiff's complaint, "a decision on the merits [is]
 2 impractical, if not impossible." *PepsiCo*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 ("Under Fed. R.
 3 Civ. P. 55(a), termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed whenever a
 4 defendant fails to defend an action."). Accordingly, the Court finds the seventh *Etel*
 5 factor does not preclude default judgment.

6 **C. Amount of Plaintiff's Recovery**

7 **1. Statutory Damages**

8 Plaintiff seeks \$4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Act. The act
 9 provides that a plaintiff subjected to discrimination is entitled to recover \$4,000 for
 10 each occasion on which he was denied equal access. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Proof of
 11 actual damages is not a prerequisite to the recovery of statutory minimum damages.
 12 *Botosan v. Paul McNally Reality*, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000). To recover
 13 statutory damages, a plaintiff need only show that he was denied full and equal access,
 14 not that he was wholly excluded from the defendant's services. *Hubbard v. Twin*
 15 *Oaks Health and Rehabilitation Ctr.*, 408 F. Supp. 923, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2004). "A
 16 plaintiff is denied full and equal access only if the plaintiff was deterred from
 17 accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion." Cal. Civ. Code
 18 § 55.56(b).

19 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that provides affirmative evidence of his
 20 damages. He states that he visited the Store once, encountered an access barrier, and
 21 was deterred from visiting after because he had personal knowledge of the barriers.
 22 This suffices to show one violation of the Unruh Act. Thus, an award of \$4,000 in
 23 statutory damages is appropriate.

24 **2. Injunctive Relief**

25 Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief under the ADA and the Unruh Act
 26 compelling Defendants to remove the barriers at the Store. A court may grant
 27 injunctive relief for violations of the Unruh Act under § 52.1(h). To be entitled to
 28 injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2), Plaintiff must show that Defendants

1 violated the ADAAG. “In the case of violations [of the accessibility provisions] of
 2 this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such
 3 facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” *Moeller v.*
 4 *Taco Bell Corp.*, 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 858 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Thus, injunctive relief is
 5 proper when architectural barriers at defendant’s establishment violate the ADA and
 6 the removal of the barriers is readily achievable. *Moreno v. La Curacao*, 463 Fed.
 7 Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2011).

8 As noted, Plaintiff stated a viable Title III discrimination claim. There are
 9 barriers at the Store that violate ADAAG, and the removal of those barriers by the
 10 Defendants are readily achievable so long as Defendants have the ability under the
 11 lease agreement and state law to access the premises and make the physical changes
 12 necessary to remove the specific barriers. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (whether the
 13 removal of barriers is readily achievable depends, *inter alia*, on the “administrative or
 14 fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity”).

15 Injunctive relief compelling Defendants to remove barriers at the Store, to the
 16 extent they have the legal right to do so under the lease and state law, so as to make
 17 the facility readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities is therefore
 18 appropriate. Specifically, Defendants are enjoined to remove all architectural barriers
 19 identified in Plaintiff’s complaint, i.e. Defendants must create a van-accessible
 20 parking space that is appropriately labeled and widen the width of the aisles to the
 21 extent they have control over these aspects of the store under their lease and state law.
 22 *See* 28 C.F.R. § 36.304.

23 3. Attorneys’ Fees

24 Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees and costs. Attorneys’ fees in default
 25 judgments are set by Local Rule 55-3. Absent special circumstances, in judgments
 26 between \$1,000.01 and \$10,000, the court sets attorneys’ fees at \$300 plus 10% of the
 27 amount awarded over \$1,000. *See* L.R. 55-3. The Court has already awarded Plaintiff
 28 a total of \$4,000 in statutory damages; therefore, attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$600

1 is appropriately awarded to Plaintiff as well. *See Moreno*, 463 Fed. Appx. at 671 (a
2 district court does not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys' fees under the
3 default fee schedule).

4 **4. Costs**

5 As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is also entitled to costs as set forth in 29 U.S.C.
6 § 1920, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and Local Rule 54-2. The Court
7 accepts counsel's declaration regarding costs and accordingly awards \$440.00 in costs.


8 **VI. CONCLUSION**

9 For the reasons stated, the Court grants Plaintiff's application for default
10 judgment against Defendants. The Court awards \$4,000 in statutory damages, \$600 in
11 attorneys' fees, and \$440 in costs. The Court also enters an injunction against
12 Defendants, compelling them to create a van-accessible parking space that is
13 appropriately labeled and comply with all other ADAAG requirements to the extent
14 they have the power to do so under the terms of any applicable lease agreement and
15 state law. **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

16

17

October 29, 2015

18
19
20 
21 **OTIS D. WRIGHT, II**
22 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**

23

24

25

26

27

28